Abstract

Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees enshrines the principle of non-refoulement, i.e., non-return of refugees to countries where they would be at risk of persecution. Article 33(2) qualifies this prohibition, allowing signatories to overcome the prohibition on refoulement for any refugee “whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” This report explores the drafters’ original intent behind the exception to non-refoulement and the position of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, both pointing to the limited reach of this exception. The report then examines how the United States’ implementation and interpretation of the “particularly serious crime” bar provision fails to comply with its responsibilities under the Refugee Convention and diverges from the interpretation endorsed by the international community and implemented in other countries. It reveals the extent of this divergence through a comparison of the United States’ approach with the approaches of Refugee Convention signatories. Finally, this report identifies legislative, judicial, and executive avenues for reform in the United States to bring U.S. implementation more in line with the nation’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
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Executive Summary

In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”), which largely incorporated the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”). Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention enshrines the principle of nonrefoulement: “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Article 33(2) qualifies that refoulement prohibition, creating an exception for any refugee “whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” This report examines how the United States’ implementation and interpretation of Article 33(2) diverges from the interpretation endorsed by the international community and implemented in other countries, resulting in a “particularly serious crime” bar in the United States that sweeps much more broadly than originally intended.

The drafters of the Refugee Convention intended the particularly serious crime exception to nonrefoulement to apply only to refugees who constitute a serious threat to the host country’s national security. The interpretation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”)—which is mandated to supervise the implementation of the Refugee Convention—consequently restricts the scope of Article 33(2) to only the most extreme cases (such as those involving a conviction of murder, arson, rape, or armed robbery), and even then requires an individualized analysis to determine whether the refugee in question has committed a sufficiently grave crime considering all the circumstances. In addition, UNHCR instructs adjudicators to consider any mitigating factors concerning the offense, to conduct an individualized assessment of whether the refugee poses an ongoing danger to the host community independent of that previous offense, and to consider the persecutory harm the refugee may face if refouled (sometimes known as the “proportionality principle”) before exercising the particularly serious crime exception.

While many countries around the world have adopted UNHCR’s interpretations of the original intent of Article 33(2), the United States has deviated substantially from this norm. In the United States, refugees can be barred from relief from removal by statute for relatively minor,

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2 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(1).

3 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(2).

4 See infra Section III.

5 See id.
nonviolent offenses like theft, filing a false tax return or failing to appear in court, with no individualized assessment of the circumstances surrounding those offenses and whether such individuals currently pose a credible threat to national security. And, even if a refugee’s conviction does not fall within these categories of crimes deemed particularly serious per se, the immigration agency in individual case adjudications has extended the bar to other relatively minor offenses such as minor drug offenses, resisting arrest or prostitution without consideration of mitigating circumstances and without an individualized assessment of current dangerousness. Additionally, U.S. adjudicators are not required to balance possible persecution in the country of origin against the gravity of the offense and threat to national security. Finally, commission of particularly serious crimes can bar individuals from asylum and withholding of removal under United States law, even though Article 33(2) was only intended to apply to individuals who were already granted refugee status.

The United States’ misapplication of the particularly serious crime exception has resulted in the deportation of individuals back to countries where they are at serious risk of physical harm or even death. Those individuals are often barred from refugee protection because of relatively minor offenses despite posing no present danger to the United States. This contravention of the United States’ treaty and moral obligations to protect refugees under the Refugee Convention and customary international law should not be allowed to continue and can be set right through legislative change, judicial reinterpretation, and/or executive intervention.

I. Introduction

Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) enshrines the principle of non-refoulement: “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Non-refoulement is the cornerstone of international refugee law, a principle of customary international law, and possibly even jus cogens—a peremptory norm of international law from which no state can derogate. Given the fundamental character of this protection, the Refugee Convention permits only one exception

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6 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art 33(1).
7 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Note on Non-Refoulement (1997) (“The most essential component of refugee status and of asylum is protection against return to a country where a person has reason to fear persecution. This protection has found expression in the principle of non-refoulement which, as will be seen below, is widely accepted by States.”).
9 See Jean Allain, The jus cogens Nature of non-refoulement, 13 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 533 (2001); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee In International Law 218 (2007) (“[C]omments . . . have ranged from support for the idea that non-refoulement is a long-standing rule of customary international law and even a rule of jus cogens, to regret at reported instances of its non-observance of fundamental obligations . . . .”); Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures That Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 Geo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 8 (2008) (“there is near-universal consensus that non-refoulement is a central, foundational norm in the refugee protection regime. For decades, as discussed below, it has been considered a principle of customary international law, and is emerging as a jus cogens norm. Non-refoulement’s fundamental character and broad application suggest that any exceptions to the principle should be extremely limited.”).
to non-refoulement: Article 33(2), which allows signatories to excuse the prohibition on refoulement for any refugee “whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”

When the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Protocol"), which largely incorporated the Refugee Convention, it bound itself to uphold the principle of non-refoulement. The United States therefore has an obligation to promulgate and interpret domestic law so as to comply with its obligations under the Refugee Convention’s non-refoulement mandate. Nevertheless, the United States’ implementation of the limited Article 33(2) exception diverges substantially from the narrow interpretation of this exception set forth by the international community and implemented in other countries, resulting in a "particularly serious crime" bar in the United States that sweeps much more broadly than intended.

This report begins by examining the historical context behind what was intended to be the limited exception to non-refoulement. It then explains the position of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United States’ implementation of Article 33(2). Next, it presents information gathered from in-country experts on how the “particularly serious crime” exception has been interpreted and implemented by other Refugee Convention signatories. Finally, this report identifies legislative, judicial, and executive avenues for reform in the United States to bring U.S. law and policy more in line with U.S. treaty and moral obligations, including the protection of bona fide refugees whose life or freedom would be threatened in their home country.

II. Drafting History of Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention

The United Nations Secretary-General initiated the drafting of the Refugee Convention in 1949. Within a year, an ad hoc drafting Committee comprised of representatives from Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Israel, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela produced a first draft of the Refugee Convention. During the initial drafting process, the British representative proposed an exception to the principle of non-refoulement “to deal with cases where a refugee was disturbing the public order of the UK”—a qualification the French and U.S. representatives found “highly undesirable” and “contrary to the very purpose of the Convention.” Nevertheless, by the Conference of the

10 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(2).
11 See 19 U.S.T. 6223 (1968); Stevic, 467 U.S. at 416.
12 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”); see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (“An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts . . . as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”).
Plenipotentiaries in July 1951, the idea had gained traction: two similar exceptions were proposed, one by Sweden and the other by the United Kingdom and France.\textsuperscript{14} The latter read: “The benefit of [the protection against refoulement] may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is residing, or who, having been lawfully convicted in that country of particularly serious crimes of [sic] offences, constitutes a danger to the community thereof.”\textsuperscript{15} An amended version of this proposal—omitting the word “offences” and adding “by final judgment”—was eventually adopted as Article 33(2).

Notably, none of the proposals were intended to enable refoulement of refugees who had committed “ordinary crimes.”\textsuperscript{16} In fact, several amendments to the British and French proposals were rejected for being insufficiently specific to crimes presenting a significant danger to the host community. For example, a suggestion to substitute the term “acts” for the term “crimes” was rejected as “subject to arbitrary interpretations,”\textsuperscript{17} as was a proposal to widen the exception to encompass habitual offenders for those with “an accumulation of petty crimes.”\textsuperscript{18} In short, the drafters of the Refugee Convention intended to empower states to expel only those refugees who posed a serious risk to the host country’s security.

In his commentary on the Refugee Convention, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (“UNHCR”) first Protection Director, Paul Weis, stated that the particularly serious crime exception was “to be interpreted restrictively,” meaning “[n]ot every reason of national security may be invoked, the refugee must constitute a danger to the national security of the country.”\textsuperscript{19} Weis interpreted the exception to contain two elements, both of which must be met for the exception to apply. He explained that “the refugee must have been convicted by final judgment for a particularly serious crime, and he must constitute a danger to the community of the country.”\textsuperscript{20} In other words, the prior conviction of a particularly serious crime is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the refugee in question presents an on-going danger to the host community. Second, quoting the words of the British representative at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, Weis noted that “[t]he principle of proportionality has to be observed, that is, . . . whether the danger entailed to the refugee by expulsion or return outweighs the menace to public security that would arise if he were permitted to stay.”\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} See Fatma Marouf, A Particularly Serious Exception to the Categorical Approach, 97 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 1427, 1455 (2017).
\item \textsuperscript{15} RES. CTR. FOR INT’L L., supra note 13, at 328.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Marouf, supra note 14, at 1454. The United Kingdom co-sponsoring delegate of the non-refoulement exception noted that “[h]e hoped that the scope of the joint amendment would not be unduly widened.” RES. CTR. FOR INT’L L., supra note 13, at 333. The French co-sponsoring delegate agreed that “[t]here was no worse catastrophe for an individual who had succeeded after many vicissitudes in leaving a country where he was being persecuted than to be returned to that country” and that “[r]easons such as the security of the country were the only ones which could be invoked against [the] right [of asylum],” id. at 327, 329 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{17} RES. CTR. FOR INT’L L., supra note 13, at 333.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Id. at 342.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Id. (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{21} Id.; see also Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees & Stateless Persons, 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 8 (1951) (statement of Mr. Hoare of the United Kingdom) (“It must be left to States to decide whether the danger entailed to refugees by expulsion outweighed the menace to public security that would arise if they were permitted to stay.”).
\end{itemize}
III. Interpretation of Article 33(2) by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The United Nations General Assembly has mandated UNHCR to supervise the implementation of the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Federal agencies and courts, including the Supreme Court, have consequently relied on UNHCR’s Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status—which pursuant to UNHCR’s supervisory responsibility sets out the Agency’s official position to “guide government officials, judges, practitioners, as well as UNHCR staff applying the refugee definition”—in their decisions.

UNHCR’s interpretation of the particularly serious crime exception restricts its application to “extreme cases” of refugees “who become an extremely serious threat to the country of asylum due to the severity of crimes perpetrated by them.” Indeed, the “double qualification—particularly and serious—is consistent with the restrictive scope of the exception and emphasizes that refoulement may be contemplated only in the most exceptional of circumstances.” The threat must be “such that it can only be countered by removing the person from the country of asylum, including, if necessary, to the country of origin,” setting a very high bar for permissible refoulement.

22 See Refugee Convention, supra note 1, Preamble (“[T]he United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the task of supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, and recognizing that the effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the cooperation of States with the High Commissioner . . . .”); see also G.A. Res. 428(V), annex ¶ 1, Statute of the Off. of the U. N. High Comm’r for Refugees (Dec. 14, 1950) (“The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments and, subject to the approval of the Governments concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities.”).


28 Id.
UNHCR “has shown concern for consistency” in the application of Article 33(2) across countries.\textsuperscript{29} The Agency insists “the gravity of the crimes should be judged against international standards, not simply by its categorization in the host State or the nature of the penalty.”\textsuperscript{30} In contrast to the United States approach discussed below, UNHCR notes, “[c]rimes such as petty theft or the possession for personal use of illicit narcotic substances [do] not meet the threshold of seriousness.”\textsuperscript{31} In fact, “the offence must normally be a capital crime (murder, arson, rape, armed robbery, etc.).”\textsuperscript{32} This is further highlighted by the fact that the qualifying term “serious” as used in the lesser “serious non-political crime” exclusion clause of the Refugee Convention requires “a capital crime or a very grave punishable act.”\textsuperscript{33} UNHCR explains that because “it is generally understood that a ‘serious crime’ is a capital or a very grave crime normally punished with long imprisonment, it follows that a ‘particularly serious crime’, [sic] must belong to the gravest category.”\textsuperscript{34}

When evaluating the seriousness of a crime, adjudicators are instructed to consider “the nature of the act, the actual harm inflicted, the form of procedure used to prosecute the crime, and whether most jurisdictions would consider the act in question as a serious crime.”\textsuperscript{35} UNHCR requires an individualized analysis to determine whether the refugee in question has committed a crime that falls within this ‘gravest category.’ It urges adjudicators to consider “the overall context of the offence, including its nature, effects and surrounding circumstances, the offender’s motives and state of mind, and the existence of extenuating (or aggravating circumstances).”\textsuperscript{36} The Agency stipulates a distinct showing of dangerousness, only applying Article 33(2) to refugees who have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and, in addition, pose a “present or future danger” to the community.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{29} Marouf, supra note 14, at 1457.
\textsuperscript{30} Briefing for House of Commons, supra note 26, ¶ 10.
\textsuperscript{31} Id.
\textsuperscript{32} Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention, Division of International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 142 ¶ 9 (1963) [hereinafter “1963 Commentary on Convention”]. This guidance was notably issued before the United States’ accession in 1968 to the 1967 Protocol, which makes it likely that the United States’ understanding of the particularly serious crime exception at the time it acceded to the Protocol was informed by this commentary.
\textsuperscript{33} UNHCR Handbook, supra note 23, ¶ 155.
\textsuperscript{34} Briefing for House of Commons, supra note 26, ¶ 7.
\textsuperscript{35} Id. (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{37} See Briefing for House of Commons, supra note 26, ¶ 11 (requiring “an assessment of the present or future danger posed by the wrong-doer”); Brief for U.N. High Comm’r as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ali v. Achim, 552 U.S. 1085 (2007) (No. 06-1346) (“Two conditions must be fulfilled: the refugee must have been convicted by final judgment of a particularly serious crime, and he must constitute a danger to the community of the country.”) (citing Res. Ctr. for Int’l L., supra note 13, at 342)); Gunnel Stenberg, Non-Expulsion and Non-Refoulement: the Prohibition Against Removal of Refugees with Special Reference to Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 221 (1989) (same); Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 27, at 140 ¶ 191 (“Regarding the word ‘danger’, as with the national security exception, this must be construed to mean very serious danger. This requirement is not met simply by reason of the fact that the person concerned has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. An additional assessment is called for which will hinge on an appreciation of issues of fact such as the nature and circumstances of the particularly serious crime for which the individual was convicted, when the crime in question was committed, evidence of recidivism or likely recidivism, etc. Thus, it is unlikely that a conviction for a
Conviction of a particularly serious crime “is not determinative of a refugee’s dangerousness because the refugee may have since become rehabilitated or disabled, which would suggest that he or she is no longer a danger to the community.” If the asylum state is capable of removing this danger by rehabilitating the refugee who presents it, Article 33(2) should not apply. Safe reintegration can be assessed by determining “whether the refugee may be regarded as incorrigible in light of prior convictions for grave offences, and the prospects for the refugee’s reform, rehabilitation and reintegration into society.”

Finally, UNHCR requires adjudicators to balance the seriousness of the crime and danger to the host country against the severity of the persecution the refugee would likely experience in his or her country of origin, calling such proportionality “a fundamental principle in international human rights and international humanitarian law.”

IV. U.S. Implementation of the Particularly Serious Crime Bar

To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal in the United States, noncitizens must demonstrate that they have a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” in their home country. Asylum is a discretionary form of relief available to those who can show a reasonable crime committed in the distant past, where there may have been important mitigatory circumstances, and where there is no evidence of recidivism could justify recourse to the exception.

See Comments on Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act, supra note 36, at 4 (“Where the refugee has responded to rehabilitative measures, or where there are indications that the refugee can be reformed, Article 33(2) should not apply because the potential threat to the community would have been (or could be) removed. Other relevant considerations would include the refugee’s behavior while serving his earlier sentence, the fact that they are released on parole, and the refugee’s co-operation in the reform programs.”).

Id.; but see Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 37, at 294 (“If compelling evidence exists that the refugee is a danger to asylum-state security or safety of the community of that country, there is no additional proportionality requirement to satisfy. By definition, no purely individuated risk of persecution can offset a threat to the vital security interests of the receiving state. Because the objective of Article 33(2) is protecting the host state and its community, a risk to important collective interests defeats the refugee’s right to invoke protection against refoulement. Refugee law does not require the application of a proportionality test once the enumerated standards are met.”).

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding of removal). Asylum affords greater benefits than withholding of removal. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 428-29 n.6 (citing Matter of Lam, 18 I. &N. Dec. 15, 18 (BIA 1981)). Withholding of removal only forecloses deportation to the country of origin, but not to a hospitable third country. See Lam, 18 I. &N. at 18. Furthermore, while an asylee may be eligible for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, noncitizens granted withholding of removal do not have this option. See id. Also, when a noncitizen is granted asylum, he or she is temporarily admitted into the United States, see H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 168 (2005), while noncitizens granted withholding of removal are not granted legal entry into the United States and may deported to their countries of origin once they no longer face...
chance of future persecution, which can be as low as ten percent.\textsuperscript{42} Withholding of removal, on the other hand, requires applicants to demonstrate a greater than fifty percent chance of persecution,\textsuperscript{43} and courts grant it much more rarely as a result.\textsuperscript{44} Once that threshold is met, however, withholding of removal is mandatory, in accordance with the Refugee Convention's obligation of \textit{non-refoulement}.\textsuperscript{45} This section will focus, however, on how the U.S. has applied the Refugee Convention's "particularly serious crime" bar to eligibility for both asylum and withholding of removal in ways that are not in compliance with the Convention's \textit{non-refoulement} obligation.

\textbf{A. U.S. Treaty Obligations Generally}

International treaties are incorporated into domestic law in a variety of ways, including through legislative ratification and judicial application.\textsuperscript{46} State constitutions often require ratification of international legal instruments by the national legislature (as in the case of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia), although some specify that treaties shall automatically have internal effect (as in the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Japan).\textsuperscript{47} Some constitutions go a step further, giving international treaties ratified by the legislature absolute precedence in the event of any inconsistencies between them and national laws.\textsuperscript{48}

In the United States, courts draw a distinction between "self-executing" and "non-self-executing" treaties. Courts can directly apply the former, while the latter require enabling legislation to be effective.\textsuperscript{49} Courts weigh a number of different factors to make this determination, but give particular weight to the intent of the drafters, including as expressed or implied by the language of the treaty itself.\textsuperscript{50} Applying the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,\textsuperscript{51} courts have repeatedly ruled that a self-executing treaty has the same

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\item any threat of persecution. \textit{See id.}
\item \textit{See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 (holding that a well-founded fear of future persecution can exist even if the applicant “only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted.”).}
\item \textit{See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (2017) (outlining the “more likely than not” standard).}
\item \textit{See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, at K1, K5 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/download (showing that, in 2016, immigration courts granted only seven percent of applications for withholding of removal, compared to forty-three percent for asylum).}
\item \textit{See \textit{Stevic, 467 U.S. at 413; INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 332 (1992) (“Because of the mandatory nature of the withholding-deportation provision, the Attorney General’s power to deny withholding claims differs significantly from his broader authority to administer discretionary forms of relief such as asylum . . . .”).}}
\item \textit{See Jackson, supra note 46, at 319–21.}
\item \textit{See, e.g., La Constitution art. 55 (Fr.); Konstitutsiia Rossiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 15(4) (Russ.).}
\item \textit{See Brownlie, supra note 46, at 77.}
\item \textit{See Jackson, supra note 46, at 320.}
\item U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. (“[A]ll Treaties made or which shall be made with the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution of Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”)
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weight as federal law. Consequently, where federal law directly conflicts with a self-executing international treaty, the most recently enacted law will prevail.

While the question of whether the Protocol and Refugee Convention provisions of non-refoulement are self-executing in the United States is disputed, there is strong reason to believe they are. REGARDLESS, when the United States acceded to the Protocol, it bound itself to uphold the Refugee Convention principle of non-refoulement, and the Convention’s provisions have largely been incorporated into domestic law through the Refugee Act of 1980 (“Refugee Act”). Thus, even if the question of whether the Refugee Convention provisions themselves are self-executing may be unclear, the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court case law make absolutely clear that federal law must be interpreted such that it does not run afoul of U.S. treaty obligations—including the Refugee Convention’s non-refoulement mandate and its limited exceptions.

B. Refugee Act of 1980—Initial Departures from the Refugee Convention

The Refugee Act incorporated withholding of removal as a form of refugee protection into the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) in order to comply with the international obligation of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention and Protocol. By codifying the United States’ Protocol obligations almost verbatim, Congress intended the Refugee Act to be interpreted in accordance with international refugee law norms.

52 See Jackson, supra note 46, at 320.
56 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]ll treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”); see also Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts . . . as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”).
57 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in non-consecutive sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also Rep. No. 96-608, at 17-18 (1979) (“The Committee wishes to insure a fair and workable asylum policy which is consistent with this country’s tradition of welcoming the oppressed of other nations and with our obligations under international law . . . .”).
58 Compare 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3) (requiring the Attorney General not to deport an individual to a country if such “alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion” with 19 U.S.T. at 6276 (requiring Contracting States not to deport any refugee to territories “where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”).
59 See Stevic, 467 U.S. at 426 n.20 (“Although this section has been held by court and administrative decisions to accord aliens the protection required under Article 33, the Committee feels it is desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform the language of that section to the [Refugee] Convention. . . . [T]he Committee feels that the proposed change in section 243(h) is necessary so that U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal obligations under international agreements.”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96-256, at 17–18 (1979) (emphasis added)); see also Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988) (“We generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts.”).
Nevertheless, the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act, departs substantially from the Refugee Convention’s framework by barring noncitizens guilty of particularly serious crimes from withholding of removal (the equivalent of Article 33(2)’s exception to non-refoulement), as well as rendering them ineligible for asylum. That approach conflicts with the exclusion clauses enumerated in Article 1(F) of the Convention, which provides the grounds for denying an individual refugee status, and which explicitly do not include commission of a particularly serious crime in the country of asylum as a basis for exclusion from refugee status. As stated above, commission of a particularly serious crime under Article 33(2) is a ground for a host country to remove a refugee when doing so would otherwise violate non-refoulement, rather than a condition under which an individual may be denied refugee status in the first place.

Furthermore, while the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act, deliberately mirrors the language of Article 33(2), it divides the particularly serious crime exception to withholding of removal into two separate parts. The first provides an exception to withholding of removal where “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.” The second applies if “the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States.” This may explain why “[a]lthough the INA preserves the language of Article 33(2), by breaking up the exception into two different statutory provisions, it loses sight of the relationship between particularly serious crimes and concerns about threats to national security, thereby opening the door to a broader interpretation of a ‘particularly serious crime’ than the drafters of the Refugee Convention intended.”

Although there was little discussion of the particularly serious crime exception during the drafting of the Refugee Act, there is some evidence that the Act’s drafters may have conflated the two elements of the Refugee Convention’s provision. A House committee report notes that the Refugee Convention provides exceptions to the protection against refoulement for “aliens . . . who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes which make them a danger to the community of the United States.” This may explain why “[a]lthough the INA preserves the language of Article 33(2), by breaking up the exception into two different statutory provisions, it loses sight of the relationship between particularly serious crimes and concerns about threats to national security, thereby opening the door to a broader interpretation of a ‘particularly serious crime’ than the drafters of the Refugee Convention intended.”

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62 See Law of Asylum, supra note 37, § 6:14 (“While the ‘persecutor of others’ and ‘serious nonpolitical crime bars’ to asylum have counterparts in the Convention’s requirements for exclusion from refugee status, commission of a particularly serious crime in the country of refuge is not a basis, under Article 1, for exclusion from refugee status. The Convention’s Article 1(F) exclusion clause is concerned only with crimes committed prior to entry; these are included within the “serious nonpolitical crime” provision. The Convention assumes that those who commit crimes in the country of refuge, including serious crimes, will be subject to the sanctions and the procedural protections of the criminal law, and that such criminal conduct generally will not affect a person’s ability to obtain international protection in the first instance.”).
63 See H.R. 96-608, at 1–5 (“although [United States law] has been held by court and administrative decisions to accord to aliens the protection required under Article 33, the Committee feels it is desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform the language of that section to the Convention.”).
67 Marouf, supra note 14, at 1456.
C. Subsequent Congressional Enactment of Statutory Per Se Particularly Serious Crimes—Major Departure from the Refugee Convention

Congress has repeatedly amended both the definition of a particularly serious crime and the authority granted to executive agencies to shape or depart from that definition. For example, since 1980, Congress has made convictions for certain crimes per se particularly serious: the INA stipulates that any “aggravated felony” conviction is a particularly serious crime that bars asylum eligibility, and one or more aggravated felony convictions with an aggregate sentence of at least five years is a particularly serious crime that bars withholding of removal eligibility. Congress also authorized the Attorney General to designate by regulation offenses that are per se particularly serious crimes. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and a majority of U.S. courts of appeals have interpreted that authority broadly, holding that the Attorney General is permitted to decide on a case-by-case basis when a criminal conviction is one that qualifies as a per se particularly serious crime. This, in turn, has allowed for the development of judicial definitions that depart substantially from the international norms discussed above.

68 See, e.g., Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-864, 62 Stat. 1206, 1206 (providing for the “unfettered discretion of the Attorney General” to grant relief from deportation when he deemed it appropriate, Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956)); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (importing the Refugee Convention and Protocol’s non-refoulement provision and exception into domestic law); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 515, 104 Stat. 4978, 5053 (“an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime.”); Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (expanding the definition of aggravated felony); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 413(f), 110 Stat. 1214, 1269 (amending former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) to give the Attorney General discretionary authority to override the categorical bar that designated any aggravated felony a particularly serious crime, if necessary, to comply with the non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 305, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-602 (“[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime. The previous sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General from determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime.”).

69 For the full list of aggravated felonies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).

70 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (“[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (“[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime.”). The higher bar for withholding of removal purportedly reflects the United States non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol. See Marouf, supra note 14, at 1438.

71 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“The Attorney General may designate by regulation offenses that will be considered to be a [particularly serious] crime . . . .”). The withholding of removal statute does not include the same explicit authorization to establish new categorical bars, but does state that its designation of certain aggravated felony convictions as particularly serious crimes “shall not preclude the Attorney General from determining that . . . an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).

72 See, e.g., Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 338 (BIA 2007); Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2009); Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2006); but see Alaka v. Attorney General of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 101 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that whether an offense is a particularly serious crime for withholding of removal purposes is reviewable by a federal court because Congress did not specific that the Attorney General has the discretion to make such determinations). For an in-depth discussion of the development of statutory and judicial definitions of particularly serious crimes, see Michael McGarry, A Statute in Particularly Serious Need of Reinterpretation: The Particularly Serious Crime Exception to Withholding of Removal, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 209 (2010).
Many of the crimes that qualify as aggravated felonies—and consequently particularly serious crimes—fall far short of the high gravity threshold that the Refugee Convention’s drafters originally envisioned. As previously noted, the drafters intended the particularly serious crime exception to apply where a refugee posed a serious threat to the host country’s national security.73 The class of aggravated felonies, per contrast, may include many minor crimes like theft,74 filing a false tax return,75 and failing to appear in court.76 None of these offenses could plausibly be viewed as threatening the United States’ national security. Moreover, the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal courts have applied the aggravated felony per se bars without any separate individualized assessment of danger to the community as required by the Refugee Convention.77 The BIA and courts of appeals have failed to require such a separate individualized assessment of current dangerousness despite congressional intent that a separate dangerousness analysis is required by the particularly serious crime exception. When Congress first enacted the aggravated felony bar to withholding of removal in the Immigration Act of 1990, Senator Edward Kennedy, who introduced the legislation in the Senate, wrote to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) that Congress “contemplated that a showing of dangerousness to the community would be necessary in addition to proof of conviction of an aggravated felony.”78

D. Board of Immigration Appeals’ Application of the Particularly Serious Crime Bar Beyond Statutory Per Se Offenses—Additional Departures from the Refugee Convention

Beyond the above-described Refugee Convention non-compliance issue concerning the statutory designation of per se particularly serious crime offenses, the Board of Immigration Appeals has deviated significantly from UNHCR’s interpretation of Article 33(2) in applying the particularly serious crime bar to other offenses in other ways that don’t comply with Refugee Convention requirements, including the following: (1) it has interpreted the particularly serious

73  See supra Section II.
74  8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G); see also Ilchuk v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 434 F.3d 618, 622–23 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a conviction for “theft of services” pursuant to Pennsylvania law is an aggravated felony barring asylum eligibility).
76  8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(Q), (T); see also Matter of Tamara Aleman, A0703 110 365, 2013 WL 4041217, at *2 (BIA June 18, 2013) (holding that a conviction for “failure of defendant on bail to appear” with a sentence of over 2 years, was an aggravated felony).
77  See supra Section II. For example, the BIA and federal court cases declining to apply this Refugee Convention separate dangerousness requirement in the U.S. see Matter of Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (BIA 1986) (“[T]hose aliens who have been finally convicted of particularly serious crimes are presumptively dangers to [the] community.”); Matter of U-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 327, 330-31 (BIA 1991) (“We find that the crime of trafficking in drugs is inherently a particularly serious crime . . . no further inquiry is required into the nature and circumstances of the respondent’s convictions for sale or transportation of marihuana and sale of LSD.”); Valerio-Ramirez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 289, 295–96 (1st Cir. 2018) (deferring to the BIA and holding that the particularly serious crime analysis does not require a distinct dangerousness finding); Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 897 (8th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that the particularly serious crime analysis requires an examination of the nature of the offense and not the likelihood of future dangerousness); Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29, 41 (1st Cir. 1997) (“This court, while acknowledging that there is ‘considerable logical force’ to the argument that the Particularly Serious Crime Exception requires a separate determination of dangerousness to the community, has upheld the agency’s interpretation . . . .”).
78  See Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 1993).
crime exception to apply to crimes falling well below the threshold of gravity originally envisioned by the Refugee Convention’s drafters; (2) it does not require immigration judges to conduct an individualized analysis taking into account mitigating factors; (3) it has interpreted the bar to no longer require a distinct current dangerousness finding; and (4) it does not weigh the gravity of the offense against the persecution the refugee will face in his or her home country if returned.

In *Matter of Frentescu*—eight years before Congress included statutory classifications of certain offenses as particularly serious crimes in the INA—the BIA held that immigration judges could find some convictions *per se* particularly serious, while others would require an individualized inquiry. In that case, the BIA articulated a multi-factor test for the individualized inquiry that required considering “the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.” Since Congress established the current framework through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IRIIRA”), it has held that IRIIRA made its *Frentescu* analysis applicable to withholding of removal cases involving aggravated felony convictions with sentences of less than five years.

In 2007, in *Matter of N-A-M-*, the BIA further refined its particularly serious crime analysis when it instructed adjudicators to first look at the elements of an offense to determine if the crime is clearly not particularly serious. If the crime could potentially be particularly serious based on the elements, then the Board authorized judges to look at the specific circumstances of the offense. Notably, the Board did not require immigration judges to analyze the mitigating circumstances if the threshold elements inquiry was satisfied. In fact, the Board discouraged such considerations, explaining that “offender characteristics” are irrelevant because they “may operate to reduce a sentence but do not diminish the gravity of a crime.”

Immigration judges were thus empowered to make Article 33(2) findings without consideration of mitigating circumstances. The BIA has since doubled down on this position in subsequent cases. In *Matter of R-A-M-*, for example, the Board held that “potential rehabilitation is not significant to the analysis.” In *Matter of G-G-S-* (recently vacated by the Ninth Circuit), it held that immigration judges cannot consider mental health at the time of the offense independently of the criminal court, justifying this deference on the basis that trial court fact finders “have expertise in the applicable State and Federal criminal law, are informed by the evidence presented by the defendant and the prosecution, and have the benefit of weighing all the factors firsthand.”

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80 See *id*.
82 See 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342.
83 *Id.* at 343.
The Board has also determined that a separate assessment of dangerousness is not required to apply the particularly serious crime bar, finding that the conviction for a particularly serious crime itself demonstrates the noncitizen’s dangerousness.86 Explaining that the “essential key” to this inquiry is the nature of the crime as determined from the elements of the offense, the Board applied this rationale to hold that offenses are particularly serious based on the offenses’ elements alone.87 The Board subsequently classified additional offenses as per se particularly serious crimes, categorically including offenses such as drug trafficking, regardless of whether the circumstances indicate future dangerousness.88 This per se analysis is an explicit deviation from the two-pronged test under Article 33(2), which has always required an independent finding of dangerousness beyond the seriousness of the conviction itself.

While the Board’s past designation of certain offenses as per se particularly serious crimes may now be supplanted by the statutory per se particularly serious crime designation of any aggravated felony for which the individual has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least five years, the Attorney General has more recently created a new near per se bar for any drug trafficking aggravated felony even if the offense does not fall within the statutory per se bar.89

Finally, the BIA has refused to apply the principle of proportionality,90 noting that “the statutory exclusionary clause for a ‘particularly serious crime’ relates only to the nature of the crime itself and . . . does not vary with the nature of the evidence of persecution.”91 The Supreme Court affirmed the BIA’s decision not to apply proportionality in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.92

The BIA’s particularly serious crime analysis has moved so far away from the bar’s intended purpose in the Refugee Convention and Protocol that individuals with relatively minor offenses have been rendered ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal.93 For example, in Tunis v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a BIA determination that a woman from Sierra Leone who had been subjected to female genital mutilation and feared returning to her home country where she would again be subjected to the torturous procedure was ineligible for

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86 Matter of Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 360 (BIA 1986) (“those aliens who have been finally convicted of particularly serious crimes are presumptively dangers to [the] community.”).
87 Id.
88 See, e.g., Matter of U-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 330-31 (“We find that the crime of trafficking in drugs is inherently a particularly serious crime . . . no further inquiry is required into the nature and circumstances of the respondent’s convictions for sale or transportation of marihuana and sale of LSD.”); Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682, 683–84 (BIA 1988) (indicating that drug trafficking is a particularly serious crime).
89 See Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (Att’y Gen. 2002) (holding that any aggravated felonies involving unlawful trafficking in controlled substances presumptively constitute particularly serious crimes, and only under the most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and compelling would departure from this interpretation be warranted or permissible).
93 See Mary Holper, Redefining “Particularly Serious Crimes” in Refugee Law, 69 Fl. A. L. Rev. 1093, 1117–20 (2017) (explaining the growing trend of the particularly serious crime bar including more nonviolent offenses as a growing trend of immigration authorities no longer relying on the length of a criminal sentence as an indication of a crime’s severity).
asylum and withholding of removal because of two offenses for selling less than a gram of cocaine. A BIA determination that reckless endangerment was a particularly serious crime was similarly upheld by the Second Circuit. In that case the court reasoned that the offense was particularly serious, despite the defendant receiving less than a year of jail time, because the reckless act—shooting a pistol into the air—had a potential for injury. In yet other cases reviewed by federal courts, the BIA found resisting arrest and prostitution offenses to be particularly serious crimes. The offenses involved in these cases are not the type of grave crimes that jeopardize the national security of a nation as originally required by the Refugee Convention’s particularly serious crime bar.

The BIA’s interpretation of the particularly serious crime bar has likewise resulted in barring individuals with significant mitigating circumstances from asylum or withholding of removal eligibility. In a recent Ninth Circuit case, the BIA’s refusal to consider mitigating circumstances in its particularly serious crime analysis was called into question by the Ninth Circuit. In that case, the BIA held that a lawful permanent resident, who suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and had been found mentally incompetent for the purposes of his removal proceedings, was barred from asylum and withholding of removal due to a finding that his conviction for assault was a particularly serious crime. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded that case with instructions that the agency consider the individual’s mental health as well as all other “reliable, relevant information . . . when making its [particularly serious crime] determination.” Nevertheless, the BIA will continue to apply its interpretation outside the Ninth Circuit.

V. Requirements of the Particularly Serious Crime Bar as Implemented by Other State Parties to the Refugee Convention

Outside the United States, the enforcement of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention varies widely depending on other treaty obligations, domestic incorporation of Article 33(2) via statute or regulation, and adjudicatory structure. This section, nonetheless, highlights some of the consistencies with Article 33(2)’s interpretation and implementation across the globe. Specifically, the tables included below highlight some of the ways other signatories

94  447 F.3d 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2006).
95  Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2008)
96  See id. at 155.
97  See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the BIA provided no “operative rationale” for its determination that resisting arrest was a particularly serious crime); Yuan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F. App’x 511, 514 (11th Cir. 2012) (vacating on other grounds a BIA determination that prostitution was a particularly serious crime).
98  See Gomez-Sanchez, 887 F.3d at 896.
100  Gomez-Sanchez, 887 F.3d at 905. Notably, the Ninth Circuit did not include instructions concerning how the agency should consider the individual’s mental health—only that it must not be wholly ignored.
to the Refugee Convention have interpreted (i) the threshold for ‘particular seriousness’; (ii) the requirement for individualized analysis and the consideration of mitigating factors; (iii) the requirement of a distinct finding of dangerousness; and (iv) the application of the proportionality principle. These tables seek to reveal the extent of this divergence through a comparison with the particularly serious crime bar’s application in the United States.\textsuperscript{101}

There are also entire regions in which even an Article 33(2) designation is insufficient to overcome the norm of non-refoulement. In Europe, for example, the 47 member states of the Council of Europe and signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights are bound by Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which creates an absolute prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\textsuperscript{102} That prohibition has been interpreted as creating an obligation of non-refoulement that cannot be circumvented by Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.\textsuperscript{103} In Ahmad v. Austria, the European Court of Human Rights indicated that this absolute, categorical prohibition on refoulement is “one of the fundamental values of democratic societies.”\textsuperscript{104} In M.A. v. France, the Court further clarified that France committed a violation of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms when it deported a man back to Algeria—despite his convictions for terrorism-related offenses—because he was likely to be tortured back in Algeria.\textsuperscript{105}

\section*{A. Minimum Gravity of the Offense Threshold}

As stated above in Section II, the Refugee Convention’s particularly serious crime bar was to be reserved for only the gravest offenses. Similarly, UNHCR has explicitly noted that ordinary or common crimes do not meet this “threshold of seriousness.”\textsuperscript{106} In fact, “the offence must normally be a capital crime (murder, arson, rape, armed robbery, etc.).”\textsuperscript{107} Specifically, UNHCR instructs adjudicators to consider “the nature of the act, the actual harm inflicted, the form of procedure used to prosecute the crime, and whether most jurisdictions would consider the act in question as a serious crime” before determining whether an offense rises to the level of “particularly serious.”\textsuperscript{108} Although the test remains somewhat subjective, the table below demonstrates that other Refugee Convention signatories interpret the Article 33(2) bar to require a minimum threshold of seriousness.

\begin{thebibliography}{999}
\bibitem{101} The authors of this report were unable to develop a comprehensive review of all signatory countries for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to the ad hoc application of the bar in some countries, the lack of a developed common law interpreting the bar in other countries, and the inability to locate an expert who could describe the bar’s interpretation and application in each signatory country. However, efforts were made to collect data on the bar’s interpretation from a diverse range of signatories, including some of the countries with the largest refugee populations. \textit{See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016 15, Figure 4 (2017)} (reporting that Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Uganda, Ethiopia, Jordan, Germany, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya are currently the top 10 refugee-hosting countries).

\bibitem{102} \textit{See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950.}


\bibitem{104} \textit{Id.}

\bibitem{105} Affaire M.A. c. France, European Court of Human Rights, no. 9373/15, 1 February 2018.

\bibitem{106} Briefing for House of Commons, \textit{supra} note 26, ¶ 10

\bibitem{107} \textit{See 1963 Commentary on Convention, supra note 32.}

\bibitem{108} Briefing for House of Commons, \textit{supra} note 26, ¶ 10.

\end{thebibliography}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Minimum Threshold of Gravity</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Austria   | Includes offenses that violate particularly important legal interests, such as homicides, child maltreatment, drug trafficking, or armed robbery.  


| Cameroon  | Includes offenses that affect national security interests and usually carry maximum penalties of death or life imprisonment, such as fomenting revolution, propagation of false information, and insurrection.  

110 Email from Justice Mukete Tahle Itoe, President at Menchum High Court, to Collin P. Poirot, Law Student at Harvard Law School, Apr. 15, 2018 (on file with author). |

| Canada    | Includes generally serious criminality, national security, human rights violations, and organized criminality.  

111 Immigration and Refugee Act of 2001, Section 115(2). |

| France    | Includes only relatively severe crimes, and the government must find that the individual is a “serious threat to the public order.”  


| Germany   | May include any conviction carrying a prison sentence of at least one year if the crime was committed intentionally and using force, threat, guile, or concrete threats to life or limb. Can also include crimes carrying a sentence of more than three years in prison. Examples of the latter include terrorism offenses, aggravated rioting, and sexual assault.  


114 See German Federal Administrative Court, judgment as of 30 March 1999 – 9 C 23-98; German Federal Administrative Court, judgment as of 5 May 1998 – 1 C 17-97; Munich Administrative Court, judgment as of 22 May 2017 – M 4 S 17.31858; Mannheim Higher Administrative Court, judgment as of 29 January 2015 – A 9 S 314/12. |

| Kenya     | Usually includes crimes that carry an imprisonment term of more than 5 years, but this threshold is not provided by law.  

115 Email from Leila Murithia Simiyu, Senior Programmes Officer & Programme Officer Legal and Social Justice Programme, Refugee Consortium of Kenya, to Collin P. Poirot, Law Student at Harvard Law School, Apr. 1, 2018 (on file with author). |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>There is no statutory threshold, but ‘particularly serious crimes’ have been found where an individual was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and where an individual was sentenced to eleven years imprisonment for two counts of rape and one count of sexual violation by unlawful sexual contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Norwegian Immigration Act allows for an expulsion decision against a Convention refugee where: “The foreign national is on reasonable grounds deemed to be a danger to national security or has received an unappealable judgment for a particularly serious crime and for that reason represents a danger to Norwegian society.” However, there is no discussion or explication of the term “particularly serious crime” in the act itself, official circulars, preparatory documents, or immigration regulations, and experts opine that the section may be seldom invoked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish removal cases under the ‘particularly serious crime’ exception are adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, the Swedish Prosecution Authority has released a memorandum interpreting the exception to cover individuals who have been convicted of a crime that carries a mandatory minimum sentence of at least two years of imprisonment, such as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, trafficking, rape, aggravated robbery, and arson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>The threshold for finding a ‘particularly serious crime’ is not found in statute and is seldom invoked in practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>May include a sentence of more than 2 years in prison, which creates a rebuttable presumption of particular seriousness. There is no statutory definition of a particularly serious crime.</td>
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</tbody>
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117  *A v. Chief Executive of the Department of Labour*, High Court, Wellington CIV-2008-485-668, 5 September 2008 at paras [5], [31].
118  Act of 15 May 2008 on the entry of foreign nationals into the kingdom of Norway and their stay in the realm (Immigration Act), Section 73(1)(b).
119  See Email from Marek Linha, Legal Advisor to the Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, to Collin P. Poirot, Law Student at Harvard Law School, Mar. 27, 2018 (on file with author).
120  Email from Arido Degavro, Partner at September Advokatbyra, to Collin P. Poirot, Law Student at Harvard Law School, Apr. 12, 2018 (on file with author).
121  *Aklagarmyndigheten, Utvisning på grund av brott*, December 2013 (hereinafter “Swedish Prosecutorial Memo”).
122  Email from Salima Namusobya, Executive Director of Initiative for Social and Economic Rights (ISER) Uganda, to Collin P. Poirot, Apr. 8, 2018 (on file with author).
B. Mitigating Factors (No Per Se Bars)

UNHCR has noted that the Article 33(2) exception should not be interpreted as creating a category of convictions which are *per se* particularly serious, and has called on signatories to take into account “the overall context of the offence, including its nature, effects and surrounding circumstances, the offender’s motives and state of mind” as well as any aggravating or extenuating circumstances. Of the countries surveyed, the majority have rejected the idea of *per se* particularly serious crimes, and require a consideration of the individual circumstances of the offense.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mitigating Factors (No Per Se Bars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>There are no <em>per se</em> bars. Rather “the act must prove to be objectively and subjectively particularly serious in a concrete individual case . . . mitigation reasons have to be considered.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Specific offenses may be considered a <em>per se</em> ‘particularly serious crime,’ such as national security offenses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>There are no <em>per se</em> bars. Applying the Art. 33(2) exception “requires a serious criminal offense, although conviction of a serious criminal offense is not, alone, sufficient to conclude that the individual is a danger to the public . . . the [adjudicator] needs to turn his mind to the actual circumstances of the offense.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>There are no <em>per se</em> bars. Individualized analysis is always required, and factors that must be considered include the specific facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the consequences of the conduct and the sentencing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>There are no <em>per se</em> bars. Cases of criminal removal are generally determined on their own merit using individualized analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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124 Comments on Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act, supra note 36, at 4.
125 Knapp email, supra note 109.
126 Mukete Tahle Itoe email, supra note 110.
127 Ramanathan v. Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, 2017 FC 834 (para. 40).
128 German Federal Administrative Court, judgment as of 31 January 2013 – 10 C 17/12.
129 Murithia Simiyu email, supra note 115.
New Zealand | The discussion over whether a conviction alone is enough to sustain an Art. 33(2) determination has yet to be resolved: “One side of the [legal and academic] debate suggests that nothing further than the conviction is required to establish danger to the community. Others take the view that the State has to establish both the serious crime and a danger to the community. In this case it does not seem to me to matter which interpretation is correct... a moderate risk of offending taking into account the very serious rape and abduction committed by [the refugee] was sufficient to constitute a danger to the community.”

Norway | There are no per se bars. The consideration of individual circumstances is required in all expulsion decisions.

Sweden | There are no per se bars. Swedish removal cases under the ‘particularly serious crime’ exception are adjudicated on a case-by-case basis.

Uganda | The analysis required for finding a ‘particularly serious crime’ is not found in statute and the exception is seldom invoked in practice.

United Kingdom | There are no per se bars. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal has held that “Art 33(2) can only be applied in a fact-sensitive way taking account of all the circumstances of the offense including its nature, gravity and consequences and of the offender including any aggravating or mitigating factors.” The Court of Appeal in England and Wales has also struck down attempts to create per se particularly serious crimes “irrespective of the sentence imposed.”

C. Distinct Dangerousness Requirement

UNHCR has consistently stated that the existence of a conviction, by itself, is inadequate to render a refugee exempt from the protection against refoulement since the refugee may have “since become rehabilitated or disabled.” In this sense, adjudicators are required to make a distinct and independent finding of ongoing dangerousness before applying Article 33(2). As shown below, the majority of countries surveyed have incorporated this requirement into their domestic implementation of Article 33(2).

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130 A v. Chief Executive of the Department of Labour, ¶¶ 30–31.
131 Linha email, supra note 119.
132 Degavro email, supra note 120.
133 Namusobya email, supra note 122.
134 IH (s.72; ‘Particularly Serious Crime’) Eritrea [2009] UKAIT 00012.
136 1963 Commentary on Convention, supra note 30, at 142 ¶ 9.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Distinct Dangerousness Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>An independent finding of dangerousness is required. The finding will be based on such factors as “repeated delinquency over a period of several years and repeated imposition of conditional and unconditional prison sentences.” 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>It is unclear whether expulsion requires a distinct finding of dangerousness, but a balancing test is performed that takes into account state security interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>An independent finding of dangerousness is required. Canadian domestic law incorporates 33(2) in Section 115(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001, which requires an independent determination of dangerousness and individualized analysis. 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Since France lacks domestic legislation directly implementing Art. 33(2), it is unclear whether such a case would require a distinct finding of dangerousness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>An independent finding of dangerousness is required. In any removal case based on a ‘particularly serious crime’ under the Residence Act of 2008, the court must engage in an individualized analysis of the case and make an independent finding of dangerousness. 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Since there is no domestic law in Kenya directly referencing ‘particularly serious crimes,’ the criminal removal grounds do not reference a distinct finding of dangerousness, but of ‘undesirability.’ 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>The discussion over whether a conviction alone is enough to sustain an Art. 33(2) determination has yet to be resolved: “One side of the [legal and academic] debate suggests that nothing further than the conviction is required to establish danger to the community. Others take the view that the State has to establish both the serious crime and a danger to the community. In this case it does not seem to me to matter which interpretation is correct . . . a moderate risk of offending taking into account the very serious rape and abduction committed by [the refugee] was sufficient to constitute a danger to the community.” 141</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

137 Knapp email, supra note 109.
139 German Federal Administrative Court, judgment as of 31 January 2013 – 10 C 17/12.
140 Immigration Act of 1967, Chapter 172, Art. 3.
141 A v. Chief Executive of the Department of Labour, para. 30-31.
United States Failure to Comply with the Refugee Convention: Misapplication of the Particularly Serious Crime 
Bar to Deny Refugees Protection from Removal to Countries Where Their Life or Freedom is Threatened

The Immigrant Defense Project & The Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program

Norway

Section 73(1)(b) of the Norwegian Immigration Act requires the non-citizen to have received an unappealable conviction for a particularly serious crime, “and for that reason [to] represents a danger to Norwegian society.” Given this phrasing, experts opine that a conviction by itself is insufficient without a further determination of dangerousness.142

Sweden

The prosecutorial memorandum referenced in section (ii) opines that a sentence of two years of imprisonment suffices to create a ‘particularly serious crime’ for the purposes of adjudicating an expulsion case.143

Uganda

The Art. 33(2) exception is seldom invoked so its elements are uncertain.144

United Kingdom

An independent finding of dangerousness is required. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal has clarified that “the requirement that the individual is a ‘danger to the community’ is a distinct issue when applying Art 33(2).”145 Expert practitioners in the United Kingdom have further indicated that a dangerousness determination “necessarily involves consideration of individual circumstances” and cannot be deemed solely “from the fact of conviction.” 146

D. Consideration of the Proportionality Principle

As discussed above, UNHCR requires Refugee Convention signatories to apply the proportionality principle in evaluating Article 33(2) exceptions.147 In practice, this means that the risk of persecution in the refugee’s home country should always factor into an Article 33(2) analysis, and must be balanced against the threat the refugee poses to the host country. The majority of countries surveyed apply this principle, and where proportionality is not explicitly considered during Article 33(2) determinations, the existence of a significant risk of persecution often creates a separate bar to removal.

142 See Linha email, supra note 119.
143 Swedish Prosecutorial Memo, supra note 121.
144 Namusobya email, supra note 122.
145 IH (s.72; ‘Particularly Serious Crime’) Eritrea [2009] UKAIT 00012.
146 Email from Eric Fripp, Lawyer with Lamb Building Temple EC4, to Collin P. Poirot, Law Student at Harvard Law School, Apr. 12, 2018 (on file with author).
147 See COMMENTS ON NATIONALITY, IMMIGRATION & ASYLUM ACT, supra note 36, at 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Consideration of the Proportionality Principle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Austria   | Proportionality is required. When there is a risk of persecution in one’s home country, the courts must grant a ‘tolerated stay’ where *refoulement* risks cannot be excluded. This way, the Austrian courts have not used Art. 33(2) to avoid the prohibition on *refoulement*.  

| Cameroon  | Proportionality is required. Nonetheless, national security interests often weigh “heavily in disfavor of the applicants.”  

149 Mukete Tahle Itoe email, *supra* note 110. |
| Canada    | Proportionality is required. The adjudicator must “assess whether the individual, if removed to his country of origin, will personally face a risk to life, security or liberty, on a balance of probabilities. This assessment must be made contemporaneously... [the adjudicator] must balance the danger to the public in Canada against the degree of risk, as well as any other humanitarian and compassionate considerations.”  

150 Ramanathan v. Canada (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, 2017 FC 834 (para. 39). |
| France    | Proportionality is required. The French domestic law incorporating Art. 33(2) is the Code of Entry and Stay of Aliens and the Right to Asylum (CESEDA), which provides that “no alien may be sent to a country if he/she proves that his/her life or freedom would be in danger there or that he/she would be at risk there of treatment contrary to article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”  

151 CESEDA, *supra* note 111, art. L. 513-2, |
| Germany   | Proportionality is required. Under the German Constitutional requirement of proportionality, an exception to the principle of non-*refoulement* can only be considered in the most extreme cases, and as a last resort.  

152 German Federal Administrative Court, judgment as of 5 May 1998 – 1 C 17-97. |
<p>| Kenya     | Since the ‘particularly serious crime’ exception is seldom invoked, it is unclear whether any individuals have been removed under this exception, and if so, whether proportionality was considered. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proportionality Requirement</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Proportionality is not required. As held in <em>Attorney-General v. Zaoui (No. 2)</em>, “the judgment . . . to be made under article 33.2 is to be made in its own terms . . . and without any balancing or weighing or proportional reference to the matter dealt with in article 33.1, the threat . . . to his life and freedom on the proscribed grounds or the more specific rights protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.”</td>
<td>Proportionality is not required. As held in <em>Attorney-General v. Zaoui (No. 2)</em>, “the judgment . . . to be made under article 33.2 is to be made in its own terms . . . and without any balancing or weighing or proportional reference to the matter dealt with in article 33.1, the threat . . . to his life and freedom on the proscribed grounds or the more specific rights protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Proportionality is required. Although concerns regarding the risk of persecution in the country of origin do not factor into expulsion decisions, risks of persecution may give rise to a separate barrier to <em>refoulement</em> such that even where an expulsion decision is issued the refugee will not be removed from the country until the risk of persecution ceases. Experts have indicated that “individual circumstances... will all be taken into account under analysis of proportionality. Proportionality must always be individually assessed in all expulsion decisions.”</td>
<td>Proportionality is required. Although concerns regarding the risk of persecution in the country of origin do not factor into expulsion decisions, risks of persecution may give rise to a separate barrier to <em>refoulement</em> such that even where an expulsion decision is issued the refugee will not be removed from the country until the risk of persecution ceases. Experts have indicated that “individual circumstances... will all be taken into account under analysis of proportionality. Proportionality must always be individually assessed in all expulsion decisions.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Proportionality is not required. There appears to be no statutory requirement of proportionality, yet Swedish courts often decide against deporting individuals who have committed particularly serious crimes where the likelihood of persecution is prohibitively high.</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Proportionality is required. The United Kingdom does not apply Art. 33(2) as an exception to <em>non-refoulement</em> where there is a risk of torture or persecution, since it considers itself prohibited from doing so by Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.</td>
<td>Proportionality is required. The United Kingdom does not apply Art. 33(2) as an exception to <em>non-refoulement</em> where there is a risk of torture or persecution, since it considers itself prohibited from doing so by Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VI. Avenues for Reform in the United States**

While countries around the world have adopted UNHCR’s approach or at least components thereof, the United States has deviated substantially from this norm. Bona fide refugees can be deported for past minor offenses with no individualized assessment of the circumstances surrounding these offenses and whether such individuals pose a credible and current threat to national security. Additionally, adjudicators are not required to balance possible persecution in the country of origin against the gravity of the offence and threat to the national security. The United States’ misapplication of the particularly serious crime exception has resulted in the

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154 See Linha email, supra note 119.  
155 *Id.*  
156 Degavro email, supra note 120.  
157 E Fripp email, supra note 146.
deportation of individuals back to countries where they are at risk of serious physical harm or even death even when these individuals are often guilty of only minor offenses and pose no present danger to the United States. This contravention of the United States’ treaty and moral obligations to protect refugees under the Refugee Convention and customary international law can be set right or at least reduced through legislative change, judicial reinterpretation, or executive intervention.

A. Legislative Avenues for Reform

Legislative overhaul is the most direct mechanism for addressing the United States’ non-compliance with its obligations under the Refugee Convention and its divergent application of the particularly serious crime exception to non-refoulement. Congress could remedy the problem in a number of ways. It could address each of the discrepancies discussed above (i.e., gravity of the offense, separate dangerousness determination, etc.) by adding a provision to the INA to require the particularly serious crime bar to be interpreted in conformity with the Refugee Convention’s drafting history and current usage by other signatory states. The first approach could, for example, involve abolishing or significantly limiting the class of “aggravated felonies” that constitute per se particularly serious crimes. It could also involve amending the statute to make clear that a separate dangerousness finding is required. Congress has made similar amendments to the INA in the past. For example, in 1996, Congress amended the withholding of deportation provision of the Refugee Act and directed immigration adjudicators to refrain from denying a refugee withholding of deportation based on the particularly serious crime exception when “necessary to ensure compliance with the [1967 Protocol].” 158 Finally, the United States could directly incorporate the Refugee Convention provisions into its domestic law in full, as countries like Germany have done. 159

B. Judicial Avenues for Reform

Federal court judges have limited authority to review discretionary decisions by the Attorney General, 160 but the Supreme Court has held that the preclusion of review applies only to decisions designated discretionary by statute—the Attorney General cannot unilaterally designate decisions discretionary and thereby evade review. 161 In other words, where discretionary authority is provided by regulation, and not by statute, courts still have the power of judicial review.

Federal circuit courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court’s holding in Kucana v. Holder to find the particularly serious crime designation discretionary, but within the bounds of judicial review because the discretion follows from federal regulations rather than statutes. 162 The INA provides that a noncitizen is barred from withholding of removal if “the Attorney

161  See Kucana, 558 U.S. at 836–38.
162  See Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011); Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 153–55 (2d Cir. 2008).
General decides that . . . the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States.”163 Because the statute only uses the word “decides” without explicit reference to discretion, the statute does not “explicitly vest discretion in the Attorney General.”164 Circuit courts (and the Supreme Court) therefore have the ability to review decisions concerning the particularly serious crime bar. Most federal circuits review the BIA’s decisions for abuse of discretion, which is a standard very deferential to the agency.165 Those circuit courts consider the particularly serious crime decision to be a discretionary, factual one that is within the purview of the BIA. But other circuit courts view the decision as the application of law (a particularly serious crime standard) to fact (the individual circumstances of the case), and so grant de novo review with Chevron or other appropriate deference.166

This distinction between the legal standard and the facts to which it is applied creates room for a reevaluation of the BIA’s standards. Both the Ninth and the Seventh Circuits have explicitly recognized this distinction: although they will not “re-weigh” the discretionary determination, they will review de novo a legal issue like applying the correct standard to the facts.167 Consequently, if the statutory interpretation of the particularly serious crime bar by the BIA is demonstrably wrong, federal judges may correct the standard by reinterpreting it to accord with the Refugee Convention.

In evaluating the BIA’s interpretation of the INA, courts have recourse to several, helpful doctrines. Courts may reject a BIA interpretation that contravenes the Refugee Convention and customary international law’s non-refoulement obligation under Chevron’s first step, which requires courts to determine whether the statutory meaning with respect to the precise issue before the court is clear.168 According to Chevron, “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”169 Given that Congress expressed clear intent that INA asylum provisions be interpreted consistently with international obligations, including the Refugee Convention, it left no gap for the agency to fill.170 Under that approach, “courts


164 Delgado, 648 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011); Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 154–55; Alaka, 456 F.3d at 96–100.


166 See Infante v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 574 Fed. App’x 142 (3d Cir. 2014); Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). While immigration judges are free to look at the entire factual record in making their determination, BIA guidance focuses on the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the individual will be a danger to the community. See Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1983).

167 See Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2006).

168 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

169 Id. at n.9.

170 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 1–5, 17–18 (1979) (“although [United States law] has been held by court and administrative decisions to accord to aliens the protection required under Article 33, the Committee feels it is desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform the language of that section to the Convention. . . . The Committee wishes to insure a fair and workable asylum policy which is consistent with this country’s tradition of welcoming the
may treat many apparent textual ambiguities in the Refugee Act as pure issues of statutory construction that may be resolved by reference to the Convention instead of by delegation to the BIA.”

In so doing, courts may rely on the “Charming Betsy” canon of statutory interpretation, which provides that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.” The Ninth Circuit has noted that “under Charming Betsy, we should interpret the INA in such a way as to avoid any conflict with the Protocol if possible.” Courts can consequently employ this rule of statutory construction to bring the United States’ implementation of the particularly serious crime exception into greater conformity with the country’s international obligations under the Refugee Convention.

Courts reviewing the BIA’s construction of the INA could also invoke the rule of lenity—which requires judges to “construe any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien”—or the principle of constitutional avoidance, reading ambiguities in the INA to avoid conflict with the Constitution. Courts have expressly found that the latter canon takes precedence over Chevron deference.

Finally, should a court find that the INA’s particularly serious crime provisions are ambiguous even after applying these rules of statutory construction, it may still find the BIA’s interpretation unreasonable under step two of Chevron and therefore impermissible.

Federal circuit courts have reversed some BIA particular serious crime findings. The Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuits, for example, have both vacated particularly serious crime opposed of other nations and with our obligations under international law); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432–33 (1987) (noting “abundant evidence of an intent to conform the definition of “refugee” and our asylum law to the United Nation’s Protocol to which the United States has been bound since 1968”).


172 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).

173 Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 783 (9th Cir. 2009).

174 Several courts have already used the Charming Betsy canon to interpret asylum provisions consistently with the Refugee Convention. See, e.g., Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390, 405 (W.D. Wash.) (“Courts generally construe Congressional legislation to avoid violating international law, in accordance with the rule of statutory interpretation announced in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy . . . . Because Respondents’ proposed interpretation of the statute may result in persecution or deprivation of life in violation of international law, Petitioners’ proposed construction is preferred as it reconciles the statute with the law of nations.”), aff’d on other grounds, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003), opinion withdrawn, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 & n.30 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In the present case, construing the statute to authorize the indefinite detention of removable aliens might violate international law . . . . Given the strength of the rule of international law, our construction of the statute renders it consistent with the Charming Betsy rule.”).

175 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449 (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).

176 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689–90, 697 (2001) (interpreting a statute to require a reasonable limit on the amount of time a noncitizen can be detained to avoid the constitutional issue implicated by indefinite detention).


178 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
determinations by the BIA that involved offenses falling well below the threshold of gravity set by the Refugee Convention’s drafters. The Ninth Circuit has gone still further to hold that it is impermissible for an adjudicator to classify a crime as per se particularly serious. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Matter of G-G-S, holding that “the Agency must take all reliable, relevant information into consideration when making [a particularly serious crime] determination, including the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the crime, whether it was considered during the criminal proceedings or not.” These decisions demonstrate that courts can use their power to overrule the BIA to better align United States law with the country’s international obligations.

C. Executive Avenues for Reform

The Attorney General can promulgate regulations or otherwise issue guidance to direct how immigration adjudicators make particularly serious crime determinations and thereby bring U.S. adjudications more in line with accepted Refugee Convention standards and procedures. For example, 8 C.F.R § 208.16(b)(4)(d)(2) instructs adjudicators that “an alien who has been convicted of a particularly serious crime shall be considered to constitute a danger to the community,” rejecting the need for distinct showing of dangerousness, as required by UNHCR. The Attorney General could withdraw this provision and promulgate regulations that bring the BIA’s approach into conformity with UNHCR’s and other countries’ standards and practices.

179 See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the BIA provided no “operative rationale” for its determination that resisting arrest was a particularly serious crime); Yuan v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 487 F. 3d App’x 511, 514 (11th Cir. 2012) (vacating on other grounds a BIA determination that prostitution was a particularly serious crime).

180 See Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1343–47 (9th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that the structure of the INA compels the conclusion that Congress intended to create only one category of per se particularly serious crimes for withholding of removal (aggravated felonies with a sentence of at least five years), consequently requiring the BIA to conduct a case-by-case analysis for all convictions outside that category).

181 Gomez-Sanchez, 887 F.3d at 896 (“This ensures that the Agency will in fact examine the circumstances of each conviction individually, taking into account all of the circumstances, as required under the case-by-case approach.”).

182 Immigration law scholar Mary Holper has suggested that courts interpret the particularly serious crime bar to include only violent offenses in which a “significant sentence” has been set. See generally Holper, supra note 93 (analyzing the particularly serious crime jurisprudence and why it has covered offenses that are not traditionally considered to be severe). Others have indicated that such a solution would bring the United States more in line with its non-refoulement obligation, but that more would be needed. See Allison Crennen-Dunlap & César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Pragmatics and Problems, 69 Fl.a. L. Rev. Forum 3 (2017) (noting further that while the solution is an important step, it does not account for rehabilitation or create a more individualized analysis in which mitigating circumstances are considered in the particularly serious crime analysis).

183 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(G)(2); 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(1)(i). In addition, the Attorney General has the power certify to himself or herself to review de novo and potentially modify or overrule prior BIA decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(G)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h).
VII. Conclusion

The United States’ misapplication of the particularly serious crime bar to *non-refoulement* has resulted in the deportation of individuals back to countries where they are at risk of serious physical harm or even death. These individuals are often guilty of only minor offenses and pose no present danger to the United States. The United States’ obligation to protect refugees under the Refugee Convention and customary international law should be honored by fixing the interpretation and application of the particularly serious crime bar either through legislative action, judicial review, or executive intervention. In these times where many refugees in the United States face serious threats to their life or freedom if returned to their countries of origin, the United States must take all appropriate actions to end its non-compliance with the Refugee Convention and its violation of the fundamental human rights principle of *non-refoulement*. 